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WHY PLEA BARGAINS ARE NOT CONFESSIONS
BRANDON L. GARRETT*
ABSTRACT
Is a plea bargain a type of confession? Plea bargaining is often
justified as, at its core, a process involving in-court confession. The
U.S. Supreme Courts early decisions approved plea bargains as
something more than a confession which admits that the accused
did various acts.1 I argue in this Article that plea bargains are not
confessionsthey do not even typically involve detailed admissions
of guilt. The defendant generally admits to acts satisfying elements
of the crimea legally sufficient admission to be sure, but often not
under oath, and often not supported by any extensive factual record.
Because plea bargains typically contain only formulaic admissions,
they have limited preclusive impact in future cases. The modern
trend has been to find issues not precluded by a guilty plea, except
perhaps as to elements of the charged offense. A deeper problem with
the lack of adjudicated facts arises when other actors later seek to
attach collateral consequences to the conviction. More careful devel-
opment of the factual record could help to prevent at least some guilty
pleas by innocent defendants, and additionally, that development
could produce reforms that would more narrowly target the collateral
consequences that now attach to entire categories of convictions.
These benefits reveal that it is particularly important to understand
precisely why plea bargains are not more than,2 and are in fact
much less than, confessions.
* Justice Thurgood Marshall Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia
School of Law. Many thanks to Josh Bowers, Sam Buell, Jenny Roberts, and Chris Slobogin
for their encouragement and invaluable comments on earlier drafts, and to Adam Gershowitz,
Jeffrey Bellin, and the William & Mary Law Review for organizing this Symposium.
1. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
2. Id.
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INTRODUCTION
Is a plea bargain a type of confession? Confessions have long been
powerful engines for expediting criminal cases, if nothing else. Con-
fessions may be very powerful before a juryindeed, a confession
may trump all other evidence in the case, for better or sometimes
for worse.3 In many civil law countries, confessions are provided in
the vast bulk of criminal cases, and the process strongly encourages
defendants to confess.4 In the United States, however, almost all
cases are plea-bargained, while custodial confessions are not rou-
tine, although their exact prevalence is unknown.5 Some scholars
have suggested that the U.S. system can be considered just as
confession-dominated as civil law systems, if plea bargains are
themselves seen as a type of confession, or an admission of guilt,
rather than merely an expeditious negotiated settlement that avoids
a criminal trial.6 I argue that whatever their other merits and
defects, plea bargains are not confessionsthey do not even typi-
cally involve detailed admissions of guilt. The defendant generally
admits to acts satisfying the elements of the crimea legally suf-
ficient admission to be surebut often not while under oath and
3. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Contaminated Confessions Revisited, 101 VA. L. REV.
395, 407 (2015).
4. See Jonathan T. Flynn, No Need to Maximize: Reforming Foreign Criminal
Jurisdiction Practice Under the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, 212 MIL. L. REV. 1,
53 (2012) (From a U.S. suspects perspective, a plea bargain is essentially a trade: an ad-
mission of guilt for leniency. Japans informal system serves the same function, with the
suspects defense lawyer gathering evidence to persuade the prosecutor that suspension [of
prosecution] is appropriate. (alteration in original) (quoting CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE
OF LAW IN JAPAN 412 (2d ed. 2008))); Stephen C. Thaman, Plea-Bargaining, Negotiating
Confessions and Consensual Resolution of Criminal Cases, 11 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. *1, *41-
43 (2007), http://www.ejcl.org/113/article113-34.pdf [https://perma.cc/DBQ7-JSTQ] (From the
beginnings of criminal procedure, the confession has always been the main simpli[fi]er and
expediter of criminal proceedings.).
5. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (Ninety-seven percent of
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.).
Over ninety-five percent of federal felony cases are resolved through plea bargains, and in
many states, still more cases are resolved through plea bargaining. See Frank Green, Jury
Trial Rate at All-Time Low in Va., RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Oct. 18, 2009, 6:01 AM),
http://www.richmond.com/news/article_69942dd3-2cf8-52a6-84c3-62a5faf96b86.html
[https://perma.cc/J77D-VWZU].
6. See generally Thaman, supra note 4.
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typically without support from an extensive factual record.7 These
characteristics have led courts to attach limited preclusive effect to
pleas in future cases, exposing why it is worth considering mecha-
nisms to more carefully develop the factual record during the plea
process. Doing so could not only help to prevent guilty pleas by in-
nocent defendants, but it could also produce reforms that more
narrowly target collateral consequences of convictions.
Despite the reality that little is admittedmuch less confessed
in a plea bargain, plea bargaining is often justified as, at its core, a
process involving confessions. The U.S. Supreme Courts early de-
cisions on plea bargaining approved a view that a plea bargain
involved not just a stationhouse confession, but more than a con-
fession which admits that the accused did various acts.8 As the
Court explained in Boykin v. Alabama, a plea is itself a conviction;
nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment.9
Far earlier, in 1927, the Court called a guilty plea more than a
mere admission or an extra-judicial confession because it is itself
a conviction.10 The Court has highlighted how a plea is entered be-
fore a judge, assuring it is voluntary and informed, with the benefit
of counsel.11 The Court has emphasized that [c]entral to the plea
and the foundation for entering judgment against the defendant is
the defendants admission in open court that he committed the acts
charged in the indictment.12
A confession in an interrogation room, in contrast, involves extra-
judicial admissions of guilt, which could be coerced or false, and, if
found involuntary or to have been given in violation of constitu-
tional requirements, may be suppressed from trial.13 Consequently,
some scholars have argued that plea bargains, in contrast to interro-
gations, produce particularly credible and valuable admissions of
guilt. Indeed, the argument is sometimes made that plea bargaining
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
9. Id.
10. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
11. See id. at 223-24; see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
12. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
13. See infra text accompanying note 26; infra note 89 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of Fifth Amendment review of the voluntariness of confession statements, see, for
example, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
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is superior to trial because the fact-finding task assigned to the
jury at trial is displaced by the defendants confession.14 The com-
mon assumption is that a defendant will not falsely condemn
himself by pleading guilty since he knows that the immediate conse-
quence is a criminal conviction.15 As one prosecutor has explained:
When a defendant agrees in a plea bargain that the state could
prove a certain set of facts ... that becomes the truth as much as it
can ever be established in the eyes of the law.16 In its key plea
bargaining decisions, the Supreme Court has made the empirical
assumption that [d]efendants advised by competent counsel and
protected by other procedural safeguards are ... unlikely to be driven
to false self-condemnation.17 Policymakers have similarly treated
guilty pleas as tantamount to admissions of guilt by, for example,
denying postconviction DNA testing to those who had pleaded
guilty,18 and generally leaving unclear the extent to which those
who have pleaded guilty are even eligible for postconviction relief.19
Further restrictions may be imposed if courts adhere to plea waivers
of access to an appeal or postconviction remedies.20
As I will argue in this Article, those confession-based justifi-
cations for plea bargaining are simply not supported. To be sure,
plea bargains are justified on many other important grounds, par-
ticularly because they are efficient, avoid uncertainties of outcomes
at trial, and permit choice, compromise, and flexibility.21 The most
14. Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 957, 968 (1989).
15. Id. at 969.
16. Joshua Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 501, 509 n.56
(2005).
17. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); see also Brady, 397 U.S. at 758
(finding low likelihood that defendants would falsely condemn themselves).
18. See Rebecca Stephens, Disparities in Postconviction Remedies for Those Who Plead
Guilty and Those Convicted at Trial: A Survey of State Statutes and Recommendations for
Reform, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 309, 315-17 (2013). Thirteen states explicitly permit
postconviction DNA testing to be granted to those who had pleaded guilty, two of which make
DNA testing nonwaivable. Id. at 315. One state explicitly bars such testing by statute, while
courts in three other states have interpreted their statutes in that manner. Id. at 316. Many
more states have statutes requiring that identity have been at issue, and many interpret such
provisions to restrict testing to those who pleaded guilty; still others have statutes that refer
to a trial. Id. at 317.
19. Id. at 321-22.
20. Id. at 324-25.
21. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975
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recent Supreme Court rulings display somewhat more of this real-
ism. In Missouri v. Frye, the Court emphasized that admissions by
defendants (not confessions) may be self-serving compromises: The
potential to conserve valuable prosecutorial resources and for defen-
dants to admit their crimes and receive more favorable terms at
sentencing means that a plea agreement can benefit both parties.22
Recent plea bargaining scholarship has also reflected more of the
same realism. The many critics of plea bargaining point out how
even the innocent may plead guilty to avoid higher penalties at a
trial, with the resulting process empowering the prosecutor and
largely eliminating judicial oversight.23 Some of those critics believe
that since admissions of guilt are important to plea bargaining,
defendants should not be allowed to plead guilty while also assert-
ing innocence.24 Others go further and argue that those who plead
guilty have, in effect, confessed, and as a result, should not be able
to obtain DNA testing that might later prove innocence.25 Plea
bargains are not confessions, but part of their power and seeming
legitimacy comes from the defendant admitting to guilt in courtor
at least appearing to do so.
Challenging the assumption that plea bargaining derives its
legitimacy from an admission of guilt is one prominent reason why
I view it as particularly important to understand that plea bargains
are not more than confessions, but are in fact much less than
confessions. To be sure, confessions themselves may be produced
under undocumented, unreliable, and coercive conditions, as I have
detailed elsewhere.26 As described in the first Part of this Article,
the confession analogy completely breaks down upon a close
(1992); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1910 (1992).
22. 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
23. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2518 (2004); Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1252-53 (2004).
24. See Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values into a Flawed Plea-Bargaining System,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1425, 1426 (2003) ([A]dmissions of guilt, even if made initially to reap
rewards, break down denial mechanisms and open the way to healing and reform.).
25. See JH Dingfelder Stone, Facing the Uncomfortable Truth: The Illogic of Post-
Conviction DNA Testing for Individuals Who Pleaded Guilty, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 47, 48-49
(2010) (relying on finality and cost arguments, not confession or admission-related
arguments).
26. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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examination.27 A hearing at which a judge approves a plea bargain
does not involve a full-blown confession to the facts of the crime.
Rather than confess in front of an inquisitor, defendants typically
make only quite limited admissions of guilt during plea bargains.28
Judges may ask a defendant to provide an allocution before
pleading guilty, but the admission of guilt need not be under oath
or very detailed, and it may just involve an in-court agreement that
the defendant committed acts satisfying the legal elements of the
crime.29 As I describe in the first Part,30 in federal court, and in
many state courts, judges need only assure themselves of some
factual basis for the crime, and it need not be based on any mean-
ingful review of the evidence.31 Indeed, the defendant may say little
or nothing at all of any substance. Practices range widely, and some
courts even tolerate plea bargains en masse with nothing particu-
larly individualized about the process.32 The governments recitation
of the facts can provide the basis for the plea, as can other evidence
from police or probation officer reports. The defendant agrees to
receive a conviction and sentence, which can bring with it prison
time and a range of collateral consequences. Those consequences
formally attach to the conviction itself and are not a confession to
the underlying facts of the crime because those facts may not have
been determined with any specificity. If a plea bargain is a confes-
sion or an admission, it is often one stating, I did it, with it being
the legal definition of the crime, but not what was actually done or
how or why.
The confession model of plea bargaining is important enough that
some critics of plea bargaining fiercely object to nolo contendere
pleas, in which the defendant makes no admission but simply does
not contest the charges, or Alford pleas, in which the defendant
asserts innocence but accepts a plea.33 Yet, I argue the distinction
between a guilty plea and a nolo contendere or Alford plea is finer
27. See infra Part I.A.
28. See infra notes 52, 59-62 and accompanying text.
29. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
30. See infra Part I.B.
31. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3).
32. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011).
33. See infra Part I.C.
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than is often supposed.34 After all, even a full plea bargain may
contain only limited admissions regarding the elements of the crime,
and not factual findings that would be determined at an administra-
tive hearing, much less those determined in a criminal trial. As a
result, the settlement of a criminal case does not contain many
admissions that could be legally relevant in future litigation. As in
a civil settlement, which does not resolve any factual issues unless
the agreement specifically states otherwise, a criminal settlement
that does not purport to make factual findings or resolve legal
claims similarly does not resolve issues that are precluded from
further litigation.35
When plea bargains typically contain only formulaic legal
admissions to elements of the crime for the limited purpose of re-
solving the criminal charges in the case, as I describe at the end of
the first Part of this Article, they have limited preclusive impact on
future cases.36 The modern trend is to find that issues are not
precluded by a guilty plea, except perhaps as to the elements of the
charged offensesand there the distinction between pleas and
Alford pleas entirely vanishes, because courts hold that an Alford
plea is also conclusive as to the elements of the offense.37 Treating
guilty pleas as convictions, but not as admissions or confessions, fits
with a model prioritizing practical settlements, not adjudication.
The analogy to confession is not only inapt and misleading, but,
as I describe in Part II of this Article, it also obscures important so-
lutions to the growing problem of tailoring collateral consequences
ofpleas.38 Theproblemwith the lack of adjudicated facts arises when
others later seek to attach a wide range of collateral consequences
34. See infra Part I.C.
35. A civil settlement precludes litigation of the claim but will not normally have issue-
preclusive effect unless it is clear from the agreement that the parties intended it to have such
an effect. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000).
36. See infra Part I.D.
37. See infra Parts I.C-D.
38. See infra Part II. For just a few examples of the burgeoning academic literature, see,
for example, Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789 (2012); Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 775 (2016); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2015);
Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2016); Michael
Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and
Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining
Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 (2011).
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to that prior criminal conviction. When the conviction without a
trial was based on very little information, courts are placed in a dif-
ficult position because they have little factual record to rely upon.
The conviction is a blunt and yet relatively empty instrument an
I did it admission. Courts and administrative agencies have
struggled with whether to impose particular collateral consequences
on convictions that were plea-bargained, precisely because the facts
of the crime were not determined and cannot be determined easily.
And precisely because they can rest on bare admissions, criminal
judgments following pleas are treated as less final and conclusive
than judgments following criminal trials.
In order for fact-finding to have preclusive effect, judges would
have to conduct a more trial-like hearing process to produce a more
robust record and ensure that the relevant issues were actually
litigated. The burden of doing so is a reason why courts have re-
sisted attaching preclusive effects to guilty pleas. More careful
development of the factual record could help prevent guilty pleas by
innocent defendants, but it would conversely create more oppor-
tunities to specifically preclude defendants in future cases. The
convictions could have more serious consequences down the road,
but perhaps that result could produce useful reforms to plea
bargaining and to the collateral consequences that attach to
criminal convictions.39 In order to secure informed and detailed
admissions, plea bargains would have to be based on detailed
admissions from the defendant, and not just outside information,
like that from a presentence report.40
More robust plea hearings would require more of an investment
of judicial resources, and such investments are sometimes made.41
For example, in the corporate prosecution setting, such detailed
admissions are a commonplace aspect of plea agreements, and the
useful result is that the criminal judgment has more finalityit
rules out subsequent efforts to avoid liability for the criminal con-
duct detailed in the agreement, but it also permits careful tailoring
39. See infra Part II.B.
40. See infra Part II.
41. See infra Part II.B.
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of collateral consequences in areas in which corporate defendants
may risk suspension or debarment by regulatory authorities.42
In the context of street crimes or less serious crimes, bare pleas
may make far more sense, but I conclude this Article by arguing
that more careful thought on what facts should support convictions
that result in collateral consequences may justify developing a
factual record that permits a more nuanced determination of which
collateral consequences should attach to which factual categories of
convicts. Creating defined tiers of plea bargaining in which more
information could inform decisions of whether to attach more severe
collateral consequences could not only reduce overbroad conse-
quences of convictions but also add accuracy to the plea-bargaining
process upon which our criminal justice system now almost entirely
depends.
I. PLEA BARGAINS AS CONFESSIONS
A. Plea Bargains Regulated as Confessions
The early Supreme Court rulings on plea bargains, running
through the early 1970s, emphasized that plea bargains would be
regulated similarly to confessions. Plea bargains were compared to
confessions, and there, plea bargains came out favorably in the
comparison. After all, a confession might occur after many hours of
harsh interrogation by police in an isolated room. In contrast, plea
bargaining produces a confession in open court, with counsel at the
defendants side, and a judge to oversee the process. The Supreme
Court therefore emphasized that in a guilty plea, the defendant
admits guilt, but only voluntarily, as in a properly admitted
confession.43 The full quotation from the Courts 1927 decision in
Kercheval v. United States reads as follows:
A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admis-
sion or an extra-judicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like
a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the court
42. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
43. Admissibility of a confession must be based on a reliable determination on the
voluntariness issue which satisfies the constitutional rights of the defendant. Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 387 (1964)).
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has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence. Out of just
consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful
that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made volun-
tarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the
consequences.44
In its opinion, the Court emphasized that a plea bargain involves
more in the way of process than in an informal interrogation set-
tingand in 1927, before Miranda v. Arizona, there was not the
same right to counsel during an interrogation.45 In contrast to an
interrogation, a guilty plea can be entered only on advice of counsel
and typically only with the presence of counsel.46
Nor is plea bargaining regulated like a confession. Unlike in the
case of a confession, in which a police interrogation may be in-
herently coercive, the voluntariness analysis in a plea bargain is
different. The Supreme Court does not find inherently coercive the
threat of a far more severe punishment at trial. For instance,
threatening a suspect with the death penalty during a custodial
interrogation is different from threatening such a sentence during
plea bargaining.47 Even after a confession that was unconstitution-
ally coercive, the Court has said a valid plea may follow.48
An interrogation is regulated differently from plea bargaining
procedures. Police may question a suspect informally, and outside
the presence of counsel.49 Police may use threats, but if doing so
overcomes the suspects will, then the resulting confession may be
excluded at any trial.50 However, not all interrogations produce
confessions, much less convictions.51 In contrast, all plea bargains
44. 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
45. See generally 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
46. Perhaps the Court gives undue talismanic significance to the presence of counsel as
well. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 778 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749-50 (1970).
48. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 796 (1970); see also McMann, 397 U.S. at
770 (refusing a withdrawal of plea when counsel misjudged the admissibility of the
defendants confession).
49. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2177-78 (2013) (addressing questioning outside
of custody); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601-02 (1990) (addressing questioning
during booking).
50. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963) (finding confession involuntary
based on threat of continued incommunicado detention); see also Lynumn v. Illinois, 372
U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
51. Of course, interrogations do not always result in law enforcement securing inculpatory
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result in convictions. They do not, I argue, themselves produce
confessions.
The act of confessing, however, has been seen as crucial to plea
bargaining. As the Supreme Court stated in its decision in Brady v.
United States: Central to the [guilty] plea and the foundation for
entering judgment against the defendant is the defendants ad-
mission in open court that he committed the acts charged in the
indictment.52 That rationale has helped to support the Courts rul-
ing in United States v. Ruiz not to require prosecutors to provide
during plea bargaining impeachment evidence found in discovery.53
If the defendant has relevant information and is confessing to that
guilt in court, then perhaps contrary evidence is, by the same to-
ken, less relevant.54
Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all the
elements of a formal criminal charge, the Court has said it cannot
be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding
of the law in relation to the facts.55 Nevertheless, the plea does not
waive Fifth Amendment privilege, as the Supreme Court held in
Mitchell v. United States.56 In Mitchell, the defendant admitted that
she had engaged in some of the charged conduct, and the judge
ultimately concluded that there was a factual basis for the offense.57
The Government argued that by making that statement, she had
waived Fifth Amendment privilege and the right to remain silent at
the sentencing hearing.58 The Court emphasized that the plea
colloquy is a narrow inquiry in which the defendant may say little
information. See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
266, 280 (1996) (suggesting a success rate of 64 percent but noting other studies with
varying results).
52. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
53. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629-30 (2002). It remains contested in the
lower courts whether prosecutors must disclose exculpatory evidence during plea bargaining.
See, e.g., Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV. 952, 992 (2012). For an
example of a court reviewing the different holdings of other jurisdictions, see Buffey v.
Ballard, No. 14-0642, 2015 WL 7103326 (W. Va. Nov. 10, 2015) (Having scrutinized the
reasoning of other jurisdictions, this Court finds that the better-reasoned authority supports
the conclusion that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to exculpatory evidence during the
plea negotiation stage.).
54. See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629-30
55. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
56. 526 U.S. 314, 324 (1999).
57. Id. at 318-19.
58. See id. at 319-20.
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or may simply make a joint statement along with the prose-
cution.59 And the defendant who pleads guilty puts nothing in
dispute regarding the essentials of the offense.60 The Court noted
that a guilty plea is more like an offer to stipulate than a decision
to take the stand.61
However, an admission to having engaged in acts that satisfy the
formal elements of a criminal charge is not a full confession describ-
ing the facts of what was done or why. An admission to having
satisfied the elements of the crime also does not reach the question
of whether any defenses might defeat criminal liability. As Professor
Kevin C. McMunigal has pointed out, the defendant may be plead-
ing guilty to elements that are objective or that involve facts that
are necessarily known to the defendant; it would be paradoxical ...
to rely on someone charged with failing to recognize or observe the
norms of reasonable conduct or belief to perform the task of fact-
ually assessing what those norms are.62
In Missouri v. Frye, the Court emphasized that admissions by
defendants may be compromises that benefit all sides: The poten-
tial to conserve valuable prosecutorial resources and for defendants
to admit their crimes and receive more favorable terms at sentenc-
ing means that a plea agreement can benefit both parties.63 The
Court merely noted that defendants admit their crimes, without
characterizing such admissions as confessions, and making clear
that defendants may be incentivized to do so in order to obtain a
more lenient sentence.64
Apart from the differing procedures regulating confessions and
plea bargains, the substance of the two is very different. On the one
hand, a confession may be detailed, consisting of statements describ-
ing a crime, and may be used in codefendants cases. On the other
hand, as developed further in the next Section, the Supreme Court
does not demand a full confession to enter a plea bargain, just a
highly legalistic admission.
59. Id. at 322-23.
60. Id. at 323.
61. Id.
62. McMunigal, supra note 14, at 979.
63. 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
64. Id.
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B. Factual Basis
At a plea hearing, or colloquy, the judge supervises a discussion
of the plea with the defendant, defense counsel, and prosecutors.
The judge does not participate in plea discussions, at least in federal
court.65 However, the judge must approve the plea, ensuring that it
is voluntary, and then inform the defendant of the essential ele-
ments of the crime and the constitutional rights waived.66 The
defendant then admits to guilt of acts satisfying those elements of
the crime.
In the federal system, [b]efore entering judgment on a guilty
plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the
plea.67 As Professor John Douglass highlights, In federal cases,
Rule 11 sets no standard for the type of evidence, degree of detail,
or standard of proof necessary to establish a factual basis.68 And as
Professor Julie OSullivan explains, Although judges may ask a
defendant to allocute, that is, to concede guilt, there is no judicial
trial or even a cursory review of evidence.69 The federal rule does
not specify that any particular type of inquiry be made as to that
factual basis.70 As the Supreme Court has noted, one way to find out
whether there is a factual basis for the plea is to ask the defendant
to speak about the crime.71 The Court has also stated that it does
not question the authority of a district court to make whatever
inquiry it deems necessary in its sound discretion to assure itself
the defendant is not being pressured to offer a plea for which there
65. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (An attorney for the government and the defendants
attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss and reach a plea agreement.
The court must not participate in these discussions.).
66. See id. r. 11(b).
67. Id. r. 11(b)(3).
68. John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 482 n.197 (2001).
69. Julie R. OSullivan, The Last Straw: The Department of Justices Privilege Waiver
Policy and the Death of Adversarial Justice in Criminal Investigations of Corporations, 57
DEPAUL L. REV. 329, 361 (2008).
70. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
71. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11,
governing pleas in federal courts, now makes clear that the sentencing judge must develop,
on the record, the factual basis for the plea, as, for example, by having the accused describe
the conduct that gave rise to the charge.).
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is no factual basis.72 But even if the judge engages in such question-
ing, the defendant need not be under oath,73 and state courts need
not follow that rule.74 Judges should assure that there is sufficient
evidence upon which the defendant could be convicted if he or she
elected to stand trial.75
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3), the judge
must determine the accuracy of the plea. As the Supreme Court
has described, [t]he judge must determine that the conduct which
the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the indict-
ment or information or an offense included therein to which the
defendant has pleaded guilty.76 The purpose of determining
accuracy in these proceedings is to ensure that the court make
clear exactly what a defendant admits to, and whether those admis-
sions are factually sufficient to constitute the alleged crime.77
But the factual basis need not come from the defendants admis-
sions. It cannot come from statements made during the process of
negotiating the plea (more akin to an interrogation, if one is pushing
the confession analogy, perhaps too far), at least when settlement
negotiations are not normally admissible evidence.78 The factual
72. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 324 (1999).
73. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f) advisory committees note to 1974 amendment (Where
inquiry is made of the defendant himself it may be desirable practice to place the defendant
under oath.). Indeed, the drafters in the U.S. House of Representatives noted, [t]he
Committee does not intend its language to be construed as mandating or encouraging the
swearing-in of the defendant during proceedings in connection with the disclosure and
acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement. H.R. REP. NO. 94-247, at 7 n.9 (1975).
74. See Gaddy v. Linahan, 780 F.2d 935, 943 n.8 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that Rule 11 is
not binding on state courts); Ames v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 772 F.2d 13, 15 (2d Cir. 1985)
(The State courts inquiry did not have to be patterned after Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.); Smith v.
Scully, 614 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ([The] requirement that federal judges
satisfy themselves that there is a factual basis for the plea is [not] a statutory restatement
of a constitutional requirement.).
75. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY 65 (AM. BAR ASSN 1999).
76. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 11
advisory committees note).
77. United States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 659-60 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting United
States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991)). The Advisory Committee noted that the
1966 amendments introducing the factual basis requirement would serve to protect a
defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature
of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committees note to 1966 amendment.
78. See FED. R. EVID. 410 (providing that conduct or statements made during plea
negotiations are not normally admissible evidence against the defendant who participated in
the plea process); see also id. r. 408 (providing that conduct or statements during civil
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basis can instead come entirely from the governments recitation of
the facts.79 A presentence report from the probation office may be a
particularly important source of factual support in federal cases.80
In state courts, which need not, and sometimes do not, impose the
same factual basis requirement as in federal court,81 the eviden-
tiary support similarly can come from a variety of sources, including
police and probation reports. As the Arizona Supreme Court put it:
The evidence of guilt may be derived from any part of the record
including presentence reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, or
admissions of the defendant.82 One survey in Indiana found loose
compliance with the factual basis requirement, due in part to a lack
of procedural requirements under state law.83 Federal courts of ap-
peals are split on whether a plea really does preclude appeal as to
the factual basis.84 Regardless, any error in producing a sufficient
factual basis for the plea can be considered harmless, perhaps be-
cause examination of other evidence, such as a presentence report,
would provide a sufficient basis.85 For these reasons, scholars have
called for greater factual review of the factual basis of guilty pleas.86
settlement negotiations are not admissible).
79. See United States v. Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d 496, 501 (1st Cir. 2011).
80. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta
Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1292 (1997) (Probation officers are likely to call misleading
facts to the attention of the court, and because the parties understand this, overtly inaccurate
factual stipulations now seem less common. There is a sense among some probation officers
that the parties have simply gotten better at hiding the facts, but this impression is
intrinsically difficult to verify. In any event, fact bargaining does not appear nearly so
prevalent as it seemed in our pre-Mistretta research.).
81. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 75, at 64, 66-68; see,
e.g., Stepp v. State, 686 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Tex. App. 1985) (Texas courts are not bound to
follow Federal Rule 11.).
82. State v. Salinas, 887 P.2d 985, 987 (Ariz. 1994).
83. See Earl G. Penrod, The Guilty Plea Process in Indiana: A Proposal to Strengthen the
Diminishing Factual Basis Requirement, 34 IND. L. REV. 1127, 1138-43 (2001); see also Jenia
Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM.
J. COMP. L. 199, 212-13 (2006).
84. See generally Kristen N. Sinisi, The Cheney Dilemma: Should a Defendant Be Allowed
to Appeal the Factual Basis of His Conviction After Entering an Unconditional Guilty Plea?,
59 CATH. U. L. REV. 1171 (2010).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Field, 39 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Adams,
961 F.2d 505, 510-12 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
86. See, e.g., John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas:
Voluntary Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88 (1977); Steven Schmidt, Note,
The Need for Review: Allowing Defendants to Appeal the Factual Basis of a Conviction After
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Others such as Professor Samuel Wiseman have criticized waivers
of access to DNA testing in plea agreements.87
Indeed, perhaps judges should more carefully ensure that factual
admissions are detailed or that there is a strong factual basis for a
guilty plea to avoid the case from being derailed on appeal or post-
conviction. Despite innocence, a defendant might plead guilty for a
wide range of reasons, including misunderstanding what is required
by the elements of the offenses, misunderstanding what intent is
required, or being persuaded by incentives such as the possible pen-
alty at trial.88 I have previously examined a set of cases in which
convicts later exonerated by DNA testing had pleaded guilty, as
innocent people may have rationally declined to risk a trial.89
Judges have treated as nonwaivable other terms in plea agree-
ments, such as ineffective assistance claims (as Professor Nancy
King has explored90), or conflicts of interest by counsel (with some
courts, like the Second Circuit, adopting detailed procedures to
ensure a valid waiver91). At the same time, plea bargains involve
waivers of a host of criminal procedure rights.92 Why the same
attention is not necessarily paid to procedures surrounding the
development of the factual basis of the plea, much less analysis of
the substance or the weight of that evidence, suggests a reluctance
to do broader fact-finding absent a trial. Further costs and benefits
of expanding the inquiry into the factual basismaking a plea
bargain more of a confessionare discussed later in this Article.
Pleading Guilty, 95 MINN. L. REV. 952, 958-59 (2010).
87. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV. 952, 958-59 (2012).
88. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committees note to 1966 amendment; see also Barkai,
supra note 86, at 95 n.35.
89. GARRETT, supra note 32, at 150-53. Among the first 250 DNA exonerations, sixteen
pleaded guilty and had no trial; ten of the sixteen had already confessed. Of the first 330 DNA
exonerations, 8 percent, or twenty-seven, had pleaded guilty, while the others were convicted
at a criminal trial (four additional individuals had trials on some charges but pleaded guilty
to additional charges). Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent Redux, in WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT
(Daniel Medwed ed., forthcoming).
90. For an excellent discussion on this topic, see Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains that Waive
Claims of Ineffective AssistanceWaiving Padilla and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 647 (2013).
91. See United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 885-91 (2d Cir. 1982).
92. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 209-10 (1995) (The plea bargaining
process necessarily exerts pressure on defendants to plead guilty and to abandon a series of
fundamental rights.).
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C. Nolo and Alford Pleas
A nolo contendere plea provides an admission just for purposes
of the case, or a consent by the defendant that he may be punished
as if he were guilty and [as] a prayer for leniency.93 As the Supreme
Court has put it, [l]ike the implied confession, this plea does not
create an estoppel, but, like the plea of guilty, it is an admission of
guilt for the purposes of the case.94 As a result, such a plea cannot
be used in a subsequent civil or criminal case. A nolo plea contains
no requirement that there be an adequate factual basis for the
plea.95
In contrast, an Alford plea permits the defendant to do more than
not contest the charges, but rather he may outright assert inno-
cence.96 Alford pleas are rare; many states do not permit them, and
federal prosecutors do not use them.97 What makes Alford pleas
interesting, though, is how they illustrate how a confession or ad-
mission need not play any role in a plea-bargained conviction. For
an Alford plea there is no confession and no admission, only a fac-
tual basis. As the Supreme Court explained in North Carolina v.
Alford: An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly,
and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence
even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the
acts constituting the crime.98
Indeed, the Court suggested such a plea was appropriate even in
that case in which there was overwhelming evidence of guilt.99 So
93. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 36 n.8 (1970).
94. Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 455 (1926).
95. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 36 n.8.
96. Id. at 37-38.
97. See U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS MANUAL § 9-16.015 (1997),
http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-16000-pleas-federal-rule-criminal-procedure-11#9-16.015
[https://perma.cc/LJX3-WS26] (United States Attorneys may not consent to the plea known
as an Alford plea ... except in the most unusual of circumstances and only after recommen-
dation for doing so has been approved by the Assistant Attorney General responsible for the
subject matter or by the Associate Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or the
Attorney General.).
98. Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. The Court stated that there may be a factual basis even if the
defendant maintains innocence: [W]hile most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial
and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the
imposition of criminal penalty. Id.
99. See id.
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a judge must arguably do more to assure factual basis for a plea
in which the defendant asserts that there is no factual basis for a
plea. As a result, some courts attach the same finality to an Alford
plea as to any other guilty plea.
D. No Preclusion Without Confession
What is necessarily decided by a guilty plea? The res judicata, or
claim preclusive effect, of a conviction is clearthe Double Jeopardy
Clause bars retrial of the same crime, whether an acquittal or a
conviction results from a criminal proceeding.100 However, apart
from claim preclusion, the collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,
remains far less clear. The great proponent of attaching issue
preclusion to guilty pleas was Professor Alan Vestal, who argued
repeatedly in his writing and before the American Law Institute
as the Second Restatement of Judgments was being drafted that:
If the defendant in entering a plea of guilty really admits the
truthfulness of the charge, then should not the admission be bind-
ing when it becomes a judgment?101
There are four traditional requirements for collateral estoppel or
issue preclusion:
(1) [T]he issues in both proceedings must be identical, (2) the
issue in the prior proceeding must have been actually litigated
and actually decided, (3) there must have been a full and fair
opportunity for litigation in the prior proceeding, and (4) the
issue previously litigated must have been necessary to support
a valid and final judgment on the merits.102
A guilty plea raises particular problems regarding the second
requirement, whether any given issue was actually litigated,
because a plea involves a settlement of an action instead of liti-
gation.103 Guilty pleas are further problematic with respect to the
100. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
101. Allan D. Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IOWA L. REV. 281, 295
(1980); see also Allan D. Vestal, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments: A Modest Dissent,
66 CORNELL L. REV. 464, 466-97 (1981); Allan D. Vestal & John C. Coughenour, Preclu-
sion/Res Judicata Variables: Criminal Prosecutions, 19 VAND. L. REV. 683, 715-16 (1966).
102. Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1986).
103. Id.
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fourth requirement, whether any particular determination was
necessary to the judgment.104 A settlement, such as in a civil case,
does not typically resolve or decide any issues, unless the agreement
makes clear that the parties intend such an effect.105 For those
reasons, Professor David Shapiro urged the Advisory Committee on
Rules of Criminal Procedure to reject issue preclusion for guilty
pleas when an issue had never been subjected to an adversary
contest leading to a judicial determination.106
As described, the charging instrument (such as the indictment)
may include detailed descriptions of the facts, but the defendant
may not admit to any or all of that conduct, or the same charges,
when pleading guilty. Courts must instead begin with what was
said during the plea colloquy. However, not much may have been
said. As Professor Shapiro put it: [T]he requirement of a factual
basis, even when enforced rigorously, differs in important ways from
an adjudication of guilt after trial. The evidence in support of the
charge may be summarized by a person who would not be competent
to testifythe prosecutor or arresting officer, for example.107 As dis-
cussed above, no issues may have been necessarily decided beyond
the agreement that the elements of the crime were met.
The Second Restatement of Judgments rejected Professor Vestals
position that plea bargains should have issue-preclusive effect:
104. Id.
105. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000) ([S]ettlements ordinarily occasion
no issue preclusion ... unless it is clear ... that the parties intend their agreement to have such
an effect.). In the case of a judgment entered by confession, consent, or default, none of the
issues is actually litigated. Therefore, the rule of this Section [describing issue preclusions
domain] does not apply with respect to any issue in a subsequent action. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1982); see also 18A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4443 (2d ed. 2002) (In most
circumstances, it is recognized that consent agreements ordinarily are intended to preclude
any further litigation on the claim presented but are not intended to preclude further
litigation on any of the issues presented. Thus consent judgments ordinarily support claim
preclusion but not issue preclusion.); cf. United States v. Intl Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 505
(1953) (finding that stipulations to tax violations in certain years did not resolve other years
not in question in the first case, but were only a pro forma acceptance by the Tax Court of
an agreement between the parties to settle their controversy for reasons undisclosed).
106. David L. Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea Have Preclusive Effect?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 27,
28 (1984).
107. Id. at 42-43.
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A defendant who pleads guilty may be held to be estopped in
subsequent civil litigation fromcontesting facts representing the
elements of the offense. However, under the terms of this Re-
statement such an estoppel is not a matter of issue preclusion,
because the issue has not actually been litigated, but is a matter
of the law of evidence beyond the scope of this Restatement.108
Thus, the fact that courts may treat the elements of the offense
as having been admitted to is not a matter of issue preclusion at all.
Today, as traditionally, courts mostly interpret plea agreements
narrowly when considering their preclusive effect. Scholars that
have advocated for broader collateral estoppel have done so only as
to the elements of the offense, or factual status that was found as
part of the offense, in line with the suggestion in the Restatement.109
As to those elements of the offense, as the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals has put it, the plea is as conclusive as a jury verdict.110
However, equating a plea with a jury verdict goes too far. Courts
have assumed that a prosecutor cannot assert issue preclusion on
an element of a criminal offense in a subsequent prosecution.111
Even as to the elements of the offense, at best, the defendant may
have admitted to committing acts that satisfy the elements, but
there was no legal judgment to that effect. A defendant typically will
not be asked whether any defenses might have negated a finding of
guilt; defenses are waived when a defendant pleads guilty, and so
were not actually litigated and therefore are not precluded in
subsequent litigation.112 As a result, as one federal district court has
noted: While the guilty plea may be considered as evidence against
the defendant in later proceedings, [the] defendant should still have
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
109. See, e.g., Richard B. Kennelly, Jr., Note, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral
Estoppel in Criminal Cases, 80 VA. L. REV. 1379, 1427 (1984) ([The use of estoppel] should
be expanded from the relatively few cases and applications where it has been used so far to
include more substantive elements of offenses, where appropriate.).
110. LaMagna v. United States, 646 F.2d 775, 778 (2d Cir. 1981).
111. See 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 105, § 4474 ([I]ssue preclusion
cannot be applied against a criminal defendant as to any element of the offense. (citing
Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384, 386 (1971))); see, e.g., United States v. Smith-Baltiher, 424
F.3d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing cases from other circuits rejecting collateral estoppel
regarding elements of criminal offenses and adopting that rule, noting: [T]he government
likewise concedes that the use of offensive collateral estoppel is not proper.).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
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the opportunity to contest facts concerning the elements of the
offense or possible defenses.113 As another court has described, [i]n
determining what facts and issues are precluded in a civil action
that is based on an underlying criminal conviction, a court may look
to the judgments of conviction, plea agreements, and facts presented
by the government during a Rule 11 hearing.114
The Supreme Court made clear in its ruling in Haring v. Prosise
that other collateral legal issues, apart from the elements of the
offense, are not typically decided prior to a guilty plea, and may
not be precluded in subsequent litigation.115 This issue often arises
when a person convicted of resisting arrest, or some other crime fol-
lowing an interaction with law enforcement, sues for civil rights
violations, such as excessive force.116
However, as the Restatement suggests, apart from issue preclu-
sion, perhaps the law of evidence might permit subsequent use of
a criminal conviction.117 Thus, as the Supreme Court has deter-
mined, statements or admissions made during the preceding plea
colloquy are later admissible against the defendant, as is the plea
itself.118 Guilty pleas may not be confessions, but they may contain
admissions. Prior convictions can be admitted as evidence in subse-
quent civil or criminal proceedings. At trial, just the fact of the
conviction itself, and not the underlying conduct, may be admis-
sible.119 And further, there may be a concern with prejudice due to
the admission of a prior conviction.120 However, any underlying facts
113. Greenhut v. Hand, 996 F. Supp. 372, 377 (D.N.J. 1998).
114. Buchanan Cty. v. Blankenship, 496 F. Supp. 2d 715, 720 (W.D. Va. 2007).
115. See 462 U.S. 306 (1983). In contrast, if there was actual litigation of a motion to
suppress prior to the guilty plea, then the legality of the search or seizure would have been
actually decided in the prior litigation.
116. It is a separate requirement that to challenge a conviction in an action under § 1983
that necessarily demonstrates the invalidity of the conviction, the litigant must have had
that prior conviction terminated in favor of the accused. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
481-82 (1994).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
118. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 324 (1999).
119. See FED. R. EVID. 803(22) (Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon
a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to
sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the Government in a criminal
prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the
accused.). 
120. The argument is that under Rule 609, untried prior convictions should not necessarily
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admitted as part of a plea bargain may be admissible hearsay
evidence, if the facts were essential to the judgment in the crimi-
nal case.121 As a result, the more detailed the admissions are in a
plea hearing, the likelier it is that such admissions could be used in,
say, subsequent civil proceedings.
Further, some courts depart from the Restatement, either because
state law does so or out of a desire to avoid the unseemly inconsis-
tency between the statements made by a person in contradiction of
the guilty plea. Courts simply do not like the idea of a person tak-
ing back a confession. As one leading treatise puts it, [g]uilty pleas
have been used to support issue preclusion, often in circumstances
that drip with the desire to prevent flat-out inconsistency.122 There
is no inconsistency, however, if the plea is not considered to have
ever been a confession at all.
II. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF ADMISSIONS
The assumption about admissions is that persons do not make
statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for
good reason that they are true.123 That assumption may not hold
true for plea bargains. Indeed, following the Supreme Courts
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, in which the Court questioned the
line between direct and collateral consequences of a conviction,124 a
defense lawyer would have to advise a client carefully before permit-
ting the client to make admissions or other statements that could
bring with them either additional direct or collateral consequences
following the conviction. Attaching greater significance to admis-
sions during the plea process would therefore complicate plea
hearings. And yet a wide range of consequences attach to a guilty
plea, placing burdens on the plea process that it cannot easily bear,
at least not in the vast majority of cases in which expedited process
is desired. A tiered plea processdemanding greater accuracy for
be available for impeachment. See generally Montré D. Carodine, Keeping It Real: Reforming
the Untried Conviction Impeachment Rule, 69 MD. L. REV. 501 (2010).
121. FED. R. EVID. 803(22); see, e.g., Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 762 (7th Cir. 1995).
122. 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 105, § 4474.1.
123. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committees note (citing Hileman v. Nw. Engg Co.,
346 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1965)).
124. 559 U.S. 356, 359-60 (2010).
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more serious crimes and sentencemay be desirable, and imple-
menting such a system reflects some of the practices in which
prosecutors demand detailed admissions when they believe it is
important to achieve a clear public acceptance of responsibility.
A. Sentencing
The lack of facts supporting a guilty plea becomes important
almost immediately after it is entered if the plea bargain does not
include a sentence as part of the bargain (and in federal court, the
judge must conduct the sentencing). Courts have struggled with
whether facts can be the basis for an enhanced sentence when the
defendant did not admit to them (like with Alford pleas).125 When a
plea bargain is not a confession, the sentence cannot as easily reflect
admitted conduct by the defendant. Instead, sentencing must be
conducted based on other evidence in the record, such as the police
reports and the presentence report. At sentencing, the defendant
also has a great incentive to speak about the crime and provide the
court with mitigating information. Because sentencing may be more
fact-intensive, perhaps it makes sense to conduct a more factually
intensive plea hearing at the outset, rather than postpone the more
robust hearing for sentencing.
Prior convictions may also be used at sentencing; the U.S. Sen-
tencing Guidelines126 centrally depend on prior criminal history to
calculate sentences.127 Further, whether the defendant made admis-
sions is also highly relevant at sentencing; the Guidelines demand
additional clarity in that context but provide that a downward de-
parture may be warranted [i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates
acceptance of responsibility for his offense.128 By placing a premium
125. See Anne D. Gooch, Note, Admitting Guilt by Professing Innocence: When Sentence
Enhancements Based on Alford Pleas Are Unconstitutional, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1755, 1790
(2010) (Any conduct for which a prosecutor plans to seek an enhancement must not only be
in the record, but also must be an element that the defendants Alford plea necessarily
established. In other words, it has to be necessary to the conviction.); see also United States
v. Martinez, 30 F. Appx 900, 905 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mackins, 218 F.3d 263,
268 (3d Cir. 2000).
126. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENTENCING COMMN 2014), http://www.
ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2014/GLMFull.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LMB-
GJDF].
127. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243-44 (1998).
128. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 126, § 3E1.1(a) (emphasis added).
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on acceptance of responsibility in order to obtain parole, our system
also demands detailed and well-supported confessions even further
down the line.129
One reason courts have shied away from preclusion following
guilty pleas, apart from the basic due process concerns, is that [t]he
prospect of being collaterally estopped at some future date may
discourage criminal defendants from settling criminal charges by
pleading guilty.130 Obviously, Rule 11 safeguards are not tanta-
mount to the full panoply of protections afforded by a jury trial.131
The Tenth Circuit has noted, [w]hile we do not question the ade-
quacy of the factual basis requirement in the context of accepting
a guilty plea, it is a lower standard than the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard required to satisfy the due process requirements of
a criminal trial.132
B. Rethinking Collateral Consequences of Pleas
The bare factual support of most guilty pleas means that col-
lateral consequences may not always be so easily imposed, should
those collateral consequences require some careful assessment of
what the criminal actually did. The Supreme Court has departed
from typical rules of deference and finality and adopted a modified
categorical approach in the deportation context. The Courts ap-
proach permits civil immigration authorities to look to the facts
and circumstances underlying an offenders conviction in order to
decide if, despite the ineligible crime of conviction, the person might
nevertheless be deportable.133 The Court has explained that if a
guilty plea is at issue, it can be resolved by examining the plea a-
greement, plea colloquy, or some comparable judicial record of the
factual basis for the plea.134 Why can this be done? After all, a de-
portation proceeding is a civil proceeding in which the Government
129. See generally Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoners Dilemma: Consequences of
Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491 (2008).
130. United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing
Kennelly, supra note 109, at 1421-22).
131. Id. at 1245.
132. Id.
133. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34 (2009); see also Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560
U.S. 563 (2010).
134. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
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does not have to prove its claim beyond a reasonable doubt.135 In
contrast, courts have been very clear that the guilty plea itself does
not resolve through issue preclusion the question of, for example,
the persons status as a noncitizen.136
Those cases raise the broader question of whether collateral
consequences should always attach to felony convictions when so
much may be negotiated, so little attention may be paid to the fac-
tual basis, and the judgment may not be a good proxy for the
seriousness of the actual conduct. Still greater concerns arise as to
misdemeanor convictions, for which the process provided may be
quite negligible. The collateral consequences may be (and should be)
an important part of the calculus when deciding whether to plead
guilty. Demanding more detailed admissions might still permit
more finely-tuned collateral consequences and fewer collateral
consequences that apply in a blanket fashion to all felony convic-
tions, or broad categories of felony convictions.
These changes might encourage a rethinking of convictions them-
selves as a status. When civil agencies like immigration authorities
seek to look for facts behind the conviction, or executives seek to
impose mercy based on facts outside the record, they are potential-
ly treating the status of convict as quite over- and underinclusive.
Failing to look behind the status and bluntly imposing strict col-
lateral consequences on broad categories of prior convictions can
impose still greater unjustified costs.
To be sure, civil enforcement agencies such as immigration
authorities can sometimes use discretion to decide whether to
attach a collateral consequence for nonmandatory consequences.
Immigration agencies may use discretion to decide whether to seek
deportation of individuals who have committed deportation-eligible
but not deportation-mandatory offenses, and they may seek to
consider a range of factors aside from the nature of the prior con-
victions. Developing more facts as part of the record at the guilt
135. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42.
136. See Michelle S. Simon, Offensive Issue Preclusion in the Criminal Context: Two Steps
Forward, One Step Back, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 753, 756-57 n.15 (2004) (citing federal cases);
see, e.g., Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1243; United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 897 (3d
Cir. 1994) (refusing to allow offensive issue preclusion); United States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d
633, 636 (11th Cir. 1992). Earlier cases predating the Second Restatement sometimes came
out the other way. See, e.g., Hernendez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1975);
Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1968).
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phase may further aid in such considerations earlier on in the
process, just as developing a more detailed presentence report may
aid in sentencing. More finely grained and individualized collateral
consequences could make our system of punishment fairer, but such
an effort might be hard to administer absent more information
generated during plea bargaining.
Nor are fact-intensive plea bargains impossible to secure. For
example, they are routinely secured in federal corporate prosecu-
tions, in which detailed statements of facts are often appended to
both plea agreements and deferred nonprosecution agreements with
corporations.137 Federal prosecutors, well aware that corporations
may face civil suits relying on the conduct in question, nevertheless
demand that corporations face the potentially preclusive effects of
those admissions (although their preclusive effect may be in doubt,
given the nonlitigation of the statements, and for reasons described
here).138 Since corporations cannot serve jail time, civil liability may
add to the deterrent effect of the punishment imposed. Prosecutors
therefore hold corporations to those statements in the sense that
they forbid companies from publicly disavowing any of the admis-
sions in those statements of facts, lest the company breach the
agreement and face more severe consequences.139 The goal seems to
be to create a detailed public record of the wrongdoing at a corpora-
tion that might otherwise not come to light absent a criminal trial.
Large-scale corporate cases may be well worth that investment, and
producing the factual record in writing, in a public document, and
largely outside the plea hearing process (although corporate plea
agreements are also commonly quite detailed140) does not impose
substantial costs.
Similar methods could be used in other serious criminal cases.
Given the costs of overincarceration, conducting more fact-finding
137. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
138. For a description of the practice, see BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW
PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 49-80 (2014), and Brandon L. Garrett,
Corporate Confessions, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 917, 918-21 (2008).
139. See Garrett, supra note 138, at 921-26.
140. An example is the Siemens plea, described in detail in GARRETT, supra note 138, at
147-76. Though the plea hearing was short, prosecutors submitted a thirty-nine page
statement of facts accompanying the plea. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 1:08-cr-00367-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2008), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/
Garrett/plea_agreements/pdf/siemens.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL3C-VY4D].
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during plea bargaining, particularly in more serious cases, could be
well worth the investment. Doing so would not turn plea bargaining
into an inquisitorial process, and would not necessarily demand
more of a detailed confession, but it could mean that judges would
more carefully ensure a factual basis for a plea. Pushing that pro-
cess from the presentence report backward to the plea itself could
improve accuracy in the most serious cases.
CONCLUSION
Professor John Langbein famously compared plea bargaining to
torture, and argued that proof beyond a reasonable doubt cannot ex-
ist in a summary plea-bargaining process.141 That being the case,
could a less summary process better develop a factual basis for a
conviction? There would be costs; the Supreme Court has long
emphasized, as it did in Santobello v. New York, that [i]f every
criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and
the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the
number of judges and court facilities.142 Moreover, the relevant
actors goal may not be accurate individual case adjudication, as
Professor Issa Kohler-Hausmann has developed in the context of
misdemeanor dockets, but rather other supervisory goals.143
If the plea process were enhanced, it might then place even more
weight than is deserved on the notion that a confession can occur
in the courtroom. Perhaps placing less weight on the notion that a
plea bargain should involve a confession or admission should mean
instead that we should not be so worried about defense assertions
of innocence accompanying guilty pleas, as Professor Josh Bowers
141. John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 15 (1978).
142. 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
143. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN.
L. REV. 611, 686 (2014).
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has argued.144 Such a shift may be all the more appropriate if all
guilty pleas are, in a way, like nolo contendere and Alford pleas.
Prosecutors can produce detailed statements of facts and admis-
sions, as is routine in some corporate prosecutions.145 Doing so may
add more legitimacy to the process, adding genuine factual support
to the horse trading that dominates the plea bargaining prac-
tice.146 To be sure, the taking of a guilty plea is not the same as an
adjudication on the merits after full trial.147 Nevertheless, far more
rigorous standards for assuring a sound factual basis for a guilty
plea would not necessarily impose undue costs, to the extent that
the same information may be important at sentencing and upon
probation.
A guilty plea is final because it is legal, not because it is a
confession, or even necessarily a particularly accurate or complete
admission. Without establishing some kind of an inquisitorial pro-
cess, a plea could nevertheless involve far more detailed procedures
for eliciting and supporting a defendants admissions. Short of a
confession, the factual basis requirement could be elevated, perhaps
under the Due Process Clause or as a matter of sound policy, to a
requirement of form but also of real substance. Doing so would raise
the cost of plea bargaining but permit more careful calibration of
punishment and collateral consequences.
The notion that those who plead guilty should be cut off from
appellate or postconviction claims, including claims of innocence, is
deeply troubling, particularly to the extent that it relies on some
144. Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1176 n.294 (2008) ([A]
ludicrous hours-long lawyer-client face-off where the partner refused to permit the client to
plead guilty unless the client would stop privately protesting innocence and admit to having
done something wrong.); see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 5.3 (AM. BAR ASSN 1971) (If
the accused discloses to the lawyer facts which negate guilt and the lawyers investigation
does not reveal a conflict with the facts disclosed but the accused persists in entering a plea
of guilty, the lawyer may not properly participate in presenting a guilty plea, without
disclosure to the court.).
145. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
146. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (To a large extent ... horse trading
[between prosecutor and defense counsel] determines who goes to jail and for how long. That
is what plea bargaining is. (alteration in original) (quoting Scott & Stuntz, supra note 21, at
1912)). See generally Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 143 (2011).
147. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 n.9 (1984).
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notion of a confession as a rationale. And collateral consequences
should not typically attach to entire categories of convicts, unin-
formed by the factual circumstances or factual support. Whether
refinements and enhancements to the plea-bargaining process are
introduced more broadly, one myth can be dispelled once and for all:
a guilty plea is not and should not be regarded as a type of confes-
sion.
